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REGULATING ACCESS TO STIMULATE COMPETITION  
IN POSTAL MARKETS?* 
 







This paper explores, from an economics and a legal viewpoint, access regulation in 
postal markets. According to the EU legal framework, the presence of entry barriers is a 
necessary condition for any intervention under competition law or sector-specific 
regulation. We argue that in a liberalized postal market, besides legal and regulatory 
entry barriers, there are no significant natural entry barriers that could ultimately prevent 
profitable entry. Hence, because of the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks, and even 
though some market segments have natural monopoly characteristics, mandatory 
access regulation (on top of competition law’s generic non-discrimination principles, 
strengthened if necessary by regulation) is not needed to facilitate competition. It may 
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REGULATING ACCESS TO STIMULATE COMPETITION  
IN POSTAL MARKETS?∗ 
 





In European Commission (2005), the Commission’s most recent progress report to the 
Council on the application of the Postal Directive1, it is stated: 
 
“Competition has yet to develop in the addressed mail segment outside 
niche services, and this suggests that limited initial market opening 
combined with sometimes limited regulatory capacity or certainty, 
advantages enjoyed by incumbents, and regulatory asymmetries have all 
combined to deter entry …The reasons for the continuously slow progress 
towards greater competition in fully liberalized postal markets are puzzling 
and deserve further analysis”. 
 
In this paper, we provide some elements for such an analysis. Clearly, with the market 
moving to a one-way distribution market and the abolition of legal barriers to entry (the 
reserved sector) in postal markets, the possibilities for competition increase, and we 
investigate whether effective competition is likely to develop on its own, or whether 
specific access regulation is necessary or desirable in attaining this end.2 We argue that 
in a liberalized postal market, besides legal and regulatory entry barriers, there are no 
significant natural entry barriers that could ultimately prevent profitable entry. We thus 
conclude that, as a result of the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks, a large section of 
the postal market will be accessible after full liberalization. Focusing on downstream 
access (competitors inserting mail at a point further down in the network of the Universal 
Service Provider (USP)), we argue that specific mandatory access regulation, on top of 
generic non-discrimination principles found in competition law and strengthened if 
necessary in sector-specific regulation, is not needed to facilitate competition and may 
be counterproductive. Not mandating access does not imply that access will be 
unavailable: the incumbent may offer it on commercial terms. Furthermore, regulating 
access may bias entry strategies towards a specific entry mode, thereby possibly limiting 
innovation.  
 
The Postal Directive does not impose specific access rules. It refers to transparent and 
non-discriminatory access to the postal network, to tariffs and special tariffs having to be 
“geared to cost”, and to the USP having to take into account avoided cost when setting 
special tariffs. Access is otherwise left to negotiations between market players. The 
                                                 
∗
 The paper is based on the TILEC study “‘Light is Right’: Conditions for Competition and Regulation in 
the Postal Market’ (June 2005) that was commissioned by Deutsche Post World Net and TNT. We thank 
the editors for helpful comments. 
1
 Directive 97/67 of 15 December 1997 [1998] OJ L 15/14, as amended by Directive 2002/39 of 10 July 
2002 [2002] OJ L 176/21. 
2
 This paper does not discuss the appropriateness of liberalizing the postal sector as such; hence, we do not 
consider the risk of a “graveyard spiral”; see Crew and Kleindorfer (2001). It is assumed that liberalization 
is justified and that the USO is adequately dealt with.  
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European Commission (2005) states that access is an important issue that merits further 
analysis, that it appears premature to draw any conclusions at this stage, and that:  
 
“Access can help facilitate market entry for upstream consolidators. New 
competitors who want to establish a delivery network can also use access for 
a transitional period to build up customer relationships and volumes, before 
being able to compete end to end with the incumbent”. 
 
This no doubt is true, but it seems only one side of the picture. If mandating access at 
regulated tariffs makes access cheap, as compared to rolling out alternative 
infrastructures, then a natural development of full end-to-end competition may be 
hindered, or may be prevented altogether. As infrastructure competition typically offers 
more scope for innovation by entrants and provides stronger incentives for cost 
reduction, upsetting the balance by making available a mandated downstream access 
alternative may thus be counterproductive. In this paper we argue that, taking into 
account EC competition law and using the principles underlying the most recent 
regulatory thinking (in particular the EC Electronic Communications Framework), 
downstream access should not be mandated via regulation. In our view, the absence of 
insurmountable natural entry barriers implies that a hands-off approach, a regulatory 
commitment to negotiated access, leaving the development of competition – and also of 
the type of competition – to the market, is most desirable. 
 
Our conclusion, hence, differs somewhat from that reached in NERA (2004) and 
Moriarty and Smith (2005), in which it is suggested that regulated access to delivery 
networks may be necessary to have substantial scope for competition. We agree about 
the potential for competition, but in our view, given that delivery is not a monopolistic 
bottleneck, the incumbent will typically want to benefit from scale economies and, hence, 
find it to be in its interest to provide access, especially when a non-discrimination 
requirement is in place. Consequently, we argue for relying on ‘freedom of contract’, 
instead of obliging the USP to provide access at regulated terms. If it were nevertheless 
found that regulatory intervention could bring added value, we believe that the 
requirements of transparency and non-discrimination should be sufficient to establish a 
competitive postal market.  
 
We note that our conclusion is in line with that of Van der Lijn and Meijer (2004). Our 
paper complements theirs, among others by providing a more elaborate legal 
perspective. We discuss the added value of our contribution more extensively in the 
concluding section, where we will also discuss related literature such as Crew and 
Kleindorfer (2002) and Panzar (2002). 
  
The remainder of this paper elaborates our arguments. In Section 2, we set out the legal 
framework in Europe, leading to the conclusion that the presence of barriers to entry is a 
necessary condition for any intervention, whether under competition law or sector-
specific regulation. In Section 3, we ask whether, in the postal market, there are natural 
barriers to entry, and we provide some indicative calculations to show that, already with 
a low market share, entry may be profitable. In Section 4, we explain the difference 
between natural monopolies, and monopolistic bottlenecks and argue that, even though 
segments of the postal market may be a natural monopoly, there is no economic 
justification for regulatory intervention on access as there are no monopolistic 
bottlenecks. In Section 5, we feed the results of the economic analysis into the legal 
framework and come to the conclusion that a hands-off approach is most desirable.  
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2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN EUROPE 
 
2.1 The relationship between competition law and sector-specific regulation 
 
With full liberalization, the reserved sector vanishes, and with it the need for detailed 
regulation to delineate and manage it. The whole sector is open to the workings of the 
market economy except for any regulation of the USP.  So regulation must rest on solid 
economic analysis in order not to cancel the benefits of the operation of the market. 
Regulation based on technical characteristics should be discarded in favor of regulation 
based on economic analysis. 
 
The design of economic regulation involves a consideration of two regulatory 
instruments, namely competition law (as a general form of economic regulation) and 
sector-specific regulation. At the outset, it should be underlined that the relationship 
between the two is conceived differently in Europe than in the US. In the latter, sector-
specific regulation will usually be expected to include provisions to deal with conduct 
harmful to competition, and if it does, antitrust law is likely to be found inapplicable.3 In 
the EU, in contrast, EC competition law is enshrined in the EC Treaty, and hence it is 
and remains in principle applicable irrespective of sector-specific regulation. The 
dominant view is that sector-specific regulation should thus concentrate on issues that 
are not adequately addressed via general competition law. 
 
As this paper is concerned with the situation in Europe, the EU approach will be 
followed. In this respect, the conceptual and analytical principles of the new regulatory 
framework for electronic communications are very relevant: there is no need to re-invent 
the wheel. However, simply transposing the end-result of the regulatory process from 
one sector to the other is neither convincing nor responsible from an academic 
perspective. Rather, the main lesson to be drawn from the new framework in electronic 
communications lies in the significance of a principled approach to regulation, which 
starts from the fundamentals.  
 
In line with the above, the electronic communications framework rests on a view of 
sector-specific regulation and competition law as complementary instances of economic 
regulation. Since competition law is generally formulated and applicable across-the-
board, it also serves as a benchmark for sector-specific regulation. Sector-specific 
regulation is meant to be aligned with competition law in substance. This implies using 
economic analysis and following the well-known steps of market definition, market 
analysis and remedies. Regulation which follows in the footsteps of competition law in 
substance is likely to be justifiable, whereas regulation exceeding the bounds of 
competition law should require a specific justification. 
 
2.2 The starting point: competition law 
 
In light of the above, it is useful to start by considering how competition law would apply 
to a liberalized postal sector. For the sake of argument, we leave aside market definition 
and the assessment of dominance, and simply assume that the incumbent would be 
found dominant on a relevant market comprising the provision of downstream services to 
competitors. The prohibition on abuses of dominant position at Article 82 EC implies 
                                                 
3
 See Verizon Communications v. Trinko, Docket No. 02-682 (US Sup Ct, 13 January 2004) 
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then that the incumbent would be bound to refrain from certain types of conduct, or in 
other words, that it would be under certain obligations as to its conduct. Two types of 
obligation come into question here: access to facilities and non-discrimination. 
 
2.2.1 Access to facilities 
 
Access issues are sometimes brought under the keyword “essential facilities”, but what 
matters is the test put forward in the case-law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In 
the case of physical facilities, the current test results from combining Bronner with IMS.4 
This test applies in order to judge whether a firm should be ordered to open up a facility 
(seen as a separate relevant market) in order to enable a competitor to compete with the 
firm on a secondary market. Before competition law can be invoked to force the opening 
of production facilities, four conditions must all be met: 
a) the facility is indispensable to operate on the secondary market, i.e. it cannot be 
economically duplicated; 
b) the refusal to give access to the facility is unjustified; 
c) the refusal to give access prevents the emergence of a new product for which 
there is customer demand; 
d) the refusal to give access is likely to exclude competition on the secondary 
market. 
Conditions a) and d) appear most relevant here and will be reviewed in turn. 
 
Indispensability of the facility. This condition was discussed at length in Bronner. That 
case is especially interesting since it is not only relevant as a legal precedent, but also 
on its facts. In Bronner, a small newspaper publisher in Austria (Bronner) wanted access 
(against reasonable remuneration) to the nationwide home delivery system of the largest 
newspaper publisher (Mediaprint), arguing that its own delivery method (using the 
Austrian post) was not competitive, and that it could not on its own (given its small 
circulation) create a parallel delivery system. The ECJ was asked by an Austrian court 
whether Mediaprint’s refusal to grant Bronner access constituted an abuse of dominant 
position within the meaning of Article 82 EC. The ECJ started by recalling that the first 
step is market definition: there might be existing substitutes to Mediaprint’s system, thus 
making the relevant market larger and possibly leading to the conclusion that Mediaprint 
is not dominant.5 Next, on the issue of indispensability, the ECJ adds that even if the 
relevant market were made up by Mediaprint’s system alone that does not suffice to 
make Mediaprint’s nationwide system indispensable.6 The ECJ notes that (i) there are 
other methods of delivery available (post, etc.) even if they are less advantageous7 and 
(ii) competitors of Mediaprint can always, alone or in cooperation, set up a rival 
nationwide newspaper delivery system.8 Very importantly, the ECJ adds that 
 
                                                 
4
 The indispensability condition is not dealt with as a separate condition in ECJ, 29 April 2004, Case C-
418/01, IMS Health, not yet reported, since the case deals with intellectual property, which is by definition 
not duplicable (or only within narrow limits in the case of copyright) and thus indispensable. It is covered 
at length in ECJ, 26 November 1998, Case C-7/97, Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791, which deals with physical 
property. For the rest, the tests put forward in the two cases are similar, with the IMS case specifying that 
the conditions are cumulative. 
5
 Bronner, ibid., para. 34. 
6
 Ibid., para. 42. 
7
 Ibid., para. 43. 
8
 Ibid., para. 44. 
 6 
“it is not enough to argue that [creating a rival system] is not economically 
viable by reason of the small circulation of the daily newspaper or 
newspapers to be distributed… [I]t would be necessary at the very least 
to establish…that it is not economically viable to create a second 
[system] with a circulation comparable to that of… the existing scheme. ” 
 
Elimination of competition on secondary market. In sectors such as electronic 
communications or energy, entrants have a limited number of entry strategies, 
sometimes only one. In some cases, these strategies require access to the incumbent’s 
facilities. In contrast, if there were a larger number of entry strategies, some of which 
would not depend on mandated or regulated access to the incumbent’s infrastructure, 
there would be competition on the secondary market in any event. In that case, a 
competitor requesting access to the incumbent facilities would thus not be invoking 
competition law in order to have a chance at all to enter the secondary market; rather, it 
would be trying to use competition law to support a specific entry strategy despite the 
existence of a range of other available strategies. Put in the balance against competing 
policy considerations – respect for property rights of the owner of the facilities – this 




On the assumption that a dominant position has been found, the holder of that dominant 
position is typically bound by an obligation of non-discrimination, i.e. discriminatory 
treatment is likely to constitute an abuse. Non-discrimination implies first of all that the 
dominant firm treats all third parties on the same footing, i.e. by offering similar terms 
and conditions.9 Only objectively justifiable differences in treatment are accepted, for 
instance rebates directly related to the volume of business. In a context of vertical 
integration, the Commission has taken a further step and claimed that “in general terms, 
the dominant company’s duty is to provide access in such a way that the goods and 
services offered to downstream companies are available on terms no less favorable than 
those given to other parties, including its own corresponding downstream operations”.10 
To this day, the ECJ has not expressly endorsed the Commission’s view. We note that 
applying this latter extension of the non-discrimination principle may be difficult, or may 
require considerable (and costly) accounting adjustments. In any event, it should not be 
used as a backdoor to impose access obligations which cannot be imposed under cases 
such as Bronner and IMS Health, as discussed above.   
 
An interesting feature of the postal sector in this respect is that part of the work involved 
in providing a postal service can also be done by the sender itself. Typically, large clients 
can involve in work sharing, carrying out some of the sorting operations themselves and 
then deliver the mail to the incumbent at some further point down the processing and 
transport chain. In return for doing part of the work, these clients obtain various rebates. 
The obligation not to discriminate under Article 82 EC implies that the rebates and other 
                                                 
9
 See Larouche (2000), 218-230, relying on leading case-law, including CFI, 6 October 1994, Case T-
83/91, Tetra Pak II [1994] ECR II-755, confirmed by the ECJ, 14 November 1996, Case C-333/94 P, Tetra 
Pak II [1996] ECR I-5951. 
10
 European Commission 1998, para. 86. Here the main examples are to be found in telecommunications 
decisions. 
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special conditions available to large clients should be available to competitors as well 
when they accomplish the same work and deliver mail in similar quantities.11 
 
2.3 The role of sector-specific regulation 
 
If regulation is put in place, it should be aligned with the competition law principles set 
out above, unless a strong justification to the contrary can be found.  
 
As to whether there is any room for sector-specific regulation, the Commission put 
forward a three-part test when selecting which markets could potentially be regulated, in 
the context of electronic communications.12 That test is framed in general terms and 
there is no reason not to follow it also in inquiring whether there is any room for sector-
specific regulation in the postal sector. Pursuant to that test, regulation only comes into 
question on markets (i) with high and persistent barriers to entry; (ii) with no prospect of 
effective competition behind those barriers over time; and (iii) where competition law 
alone does not suffice to address the problems. All of these conditions must be fulfilled. 
 
Furthermore, if and when these conditions are fulfilled for a given market, a number of 
principles govern the imposition of regulatory remedies upon firms found to be dominant 
on that market. These principles are now central to the new framework for the regulation 
of electronic communications, but they are not new: they correspond to general 
principles of EC law and as such are equally applicable to the postal sector. They are 
adequacy (the regulatory remedy must address the problem which was identified) and 
proportionality (the regulatory remedy must be likely to remove the problem identified, 
must not restrict the freedom of firms more than is necessary to achieve its aims and 
must be in proportion to the problem in question). These principles are reflected in the 
structure of the Access Directive for electronic communications,13 which provides a 
range of remedies for regulatory authorities to consider: transparency, non-
discrimination, accounting separation, access and price controls. Very importantly, this 
range increases in intensity, and in line with the principles of adequacy and 
proportionality, authorities must first look at the lighter remedies and consider the 
heavier ones only if the lighter ones can be proven insufficient.  
 
2.4. Conclusion on the legal framework 
 
Whether it is to assess whether downstream access can be forced pursuant to EC 
competition law or to decide whether sector-specific regulation of downstream access is 
required, the key issue is whether substantial entry barriers are present. Only then are 
the Bronner/IMS conditions met and the first condition for the justifiability of sector-
specific regulation fulfilled. We now address this issue from the economic point of view. 
 
3. ENTRY BARRIERS AND ENTRY STRATEGIES 
 
 It is common to distinguish entry barriers into “natural”, “strategic”, and “legal” ones, where the 
latter category also includes regulatory barriers, such as regulatory uncertainty. As the objective 
                                                 
11
 A point made by the Commission in its Decision of 20 October 2004, available on the DG COMP 
website (visited 20 May 2005), para. 86. 
12
 European Commission (2003), Rec. 9. These threefold test is further developed in the Explanatory 
Memorandum accompanying the Recommendation. 
13
 Access Directive: Directive 2002/19 of 7 March 2002 [2002] OJ L 108/7, Art. 9-13. 
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of postal market liberalization is to gradually remove the legal entry barriers, we will leave these 
out of our discussion.
14
 Strategic entry barriers, those resulting from the possible anti-competitive 
behavior of the incumbent USP, can be tackled by competition policy, and will also not be 
discussed here.15 Our focus will, hence, be on natural entry barriers, originating in structural 
characteristics of the market. 
 
As noted in NERA (2004), the economic literature on natural entry barriers is less developed than 
is desirable. The literature offers a range of alternative, non-equivalent definitions, the most well-
known being those of Bain (1956) (“an advantage that incumbent providers in an industry have 
over potential entrants, that allows them to elevate their prices above the level that could be 
expected in a competitive market without inducing potential entrants to enter the industry”) and 
Stigler (1968) (“a cost of producing … which must be borne by a firm which seeks to enter an 
industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry.” ) According to both of these, sunk 
costs (costs associated with entry that cannot be recovered when the firm exits again), can be an 
important entry barrier. However, according to NERA (2004), sunk costs are negligible for most 
postal operations, specifically for those that build on computerized pre-sorting and manual 
sequencing; see also Panzar (2002), De Bijl et al. (2003) and the discussion in the next Section. 
Consequently, in the postal sector, sunk cost can effectively be ignored as a potential source of 
barriers to entry. 
 
The two definitions, however, take a different stance as to whether scale economies are 
entry barriers: according to the Bain definition, they are, according to Stigler’s definition, 
they are not. NERA (2004) shows that economies of scale (or economies of density, as 
they are called there) are very important in the postal sector: “When traffic increases on 
a fixed postal network, unit costs fall. In the original 15 Member States total costs would 
increase by 6.5 per cent if traffic on a fixed network were to increase by 10 per cent”. We 
concur with Stigler that scale economies do not constitute a barrier to entry: if an entrant 
would have a superior technology, then it could make an offer to the large senders that 
would make all these senders better off and that would be profitable if it would be 
accepted by all these. To put this more precisely, scale economies alone do not 
constitute an entry barrier. It would only be impossible for the entrant to enter if the 
business senders were loyal to the incumbent, that is, if there simultaneously would be 
demand side inertia.    
 
The same conclusion has recently been obtained, more generally, in McAfee et al. 
(2004). That paper, however, also concludes that scale economies combined with brand 
loyalty may produce an entry barrier. The intuition is easily seen: if customers display 
brand loyalty towards the incumbent, then the entrant can build up market share only 
slowly, hence, revenues will be lower at the start, and, if investments are lumpy and 
have to be incurred at the start of the operations, this may make entry unprofitable. The 
question thus is whether, in the postal sector, brand loyalty is so large, and investments 
so lumpy so as to induce an entry barrier in combination with scale economies. Direct 
evidence on the first issue is scant, but Moriarty and Smith (2005) show that, in the UK, 
costumer awareness of competition is low, thus inducing a kind of brand loyalty. We 
believe that this is a transitory phenomenon and that experience with liberalization in 
other sectors clearly shows that large costumers quickly switch to better offers when 
                                                 
14
 The VAT exemption for USO postal services supplied by the incumbent constitutes an important legal 
entry barrier, as stressed in Moriarty and Smith (2005). We note that, in the Netherlands, the exemption 
applies only for mail that is handled at regulated USO rates, thus lowering this barrier. 
15
 See Jonsson and Selander (2005) for a discussion of strategic entry barriers in the Swedish market. 
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these are available. Secondly, the postal sector clearly demonstrates that entry can be 
effected at different scales, and that investments can be postponed and carried out in a 
stepwise manner to match with demand. We conclude that scale economies do not 
constitute substantial entry barriers.  
 
In other words, in our view, while theoretically some (non-artificial) entry barriers in the 
postal market may exist, these could only have a small effect. It is important to make a 
distinction between high and low entry barriers. The key question for policy is whether 
the entry barriers are so high as to make access regulation desirable. In order to assess 
whether it is justified to compel network access, it is important to determine the effects of 
possible entry barriers. In the process, one has to look at the alternatives, hence, one 
has to answer the question of what is the best way to do away with the limitations on 
competition resulting from entry barriers, if any. As we argue below, a large segment of 
the market is accessible for competitors: substantial entry barriers, that would justify 
regulating access to the USPs networks, do not exist. 
 
In this respect, it is also important to note that entrants’ customers can continue to avail 
themselves of the services of the incumbent postal operator (PO) for delivery zones or 
products not serviced by their competitive entrant. They can do this either directly 
themselves or through their entrant service provider, who can either use generic 
services of the PO for mail they do not wish to deliver themselves or negotiate special 
access agreements with the PO if volumes are sufficiently large to make this worthwhile 
for both parties; see Crew and Kleindorfer (2001, 2002). 
 
Given scale economies in delivery, the natural question to address is how large a market 
share a ‘reasonably efficient’ entrant needs to obtain in order to reach cost parity with 
the incumbent. Although providing an answer is beyond the scope of this paper (as it 
depends on the precise details of the market under consideration, on the cost structure 
and the efficiency of the incumbent, on the wage premiums that it pays, etc.), we 
nevertheless provide a perspective by showing that the papers that have addressed this 
issue have come up with widely varying estimates. 
 
Cohen and Chu (1997) were the first to calculate the critical market share that a 
competitor would need to capture in order to have the same unit cost as the US Postal 
Service. Their calculation is based on a cost function that is estimated on detailed data 
from the US Postal Services. They conclude that it is very difficult to enter the US 
market: an entrant that has a cost advantage of 50% and that delivers only one day a 
week would still need 15% market share in order to reach cost parity with the US Postal 
Service. An entrant that delivers two days a week would need 19% market share if it had 
a 50% cost advantage, and 23% if it had a 33% cost advantage. It seems that the critical 
market share for the US is relatively high. 
 
A similar conclusion has been drawn for the UK in Postcomm (2004); also see Moriarty 
and Smith (2005). Annex 1 to the “Competitive Market Review” reports results from a 
model that has been developed by Royal Mail and concludes that significant volume 
may be required to compete profitably head to head with Royal Mail: “to match Royal 
Mail’s present unit cost for delivery six days per week, and depending on the 
assumptions about new entrant’s costs compared to Royal Mail, a new entrant might 
need to capture around 50% market share”. As Chart A1.1 in that Annex shows, an 
entrant that delivers only one day per week would still need about 30% market share to 
reach cost parity. 
 10 
 
Note, however, that the existing USP’s cost function need not be very relevant for new 
entrants: they will not choose to mimic the business models and networks of 
incumbents. The latter originate from a time when the postal market was very different 
and they have been designed to fulfill the universal service obligation that is imposed on 
the incumbent. Entrants do not face such restrictions, and they will take advantage of the 
current situation. The postal market has moved away from a traditional two-way 
communications market, with businesses (rather than consumers) now being 
responsible for 80 to 90% of the mail that is offered. As single item residential mail is 
only a small segment of the market and as handling of it is costly, it is less attractive to 
entrants. They will predominantly focus on the B2B and B2C segments, both on high 
value mail as well as on bulk mail. Restricting ourselves to the latter, we note that 
entrants’ ability to compete in this segment is enhanced by the fact that the market is 
relatively concentrated on the sender side. To illustrate, IG&H (2003) shows that, in the 
Netherlands, 50% of the mail originates from 500 to 600 large senders. Such mail can 
be pre-sorted electronically, hence, the entrant just has to focus on sequence sorting 
and actual delivery, where the first task can easily be done manually (hence, not 
needing costly investments) as long as the entrant serves a limited number of 
customers. Consequently, entrants can keep their operations straightforward and cheap 
by targeting a few large senders that generate sufficient volume. Indeed, several 
successful entrants in European postal markets, such as CityMail in Sweden, and Sandd 
and Selektmail in the Netherlands, seem to adopt models of this type.  
 
The relevant question thus is what volume an entrant with such a business model needs 
in order to reach cost parity with the incumbent in delivery. As such an entrant will incur 
lower sequence sorting costs than a (traditional) incumbent that manually sequences the 
mail, we may focus on actual delivery. Obviously, to reach economies of scale, the 
entrant would like to limit the frequency of delivery as well as to restrict operations as 
much as possible to low cost, high-density areas; where its volume is thin, the entrant 
will prefer to hand the mail to the incumbent for delivery.  
 
 Studies for the Netherlands have concluded that an entrant’s critical market share is 
low. Using the methodology from Cohen and Chu (1997), SEO (2003) concludes that an 
entrant to the Dutch market would only need 10% of the volume to be able to compete 
with the incumbent TNT Post (formerly known as TPG Post) on the basis of six delivery 
days per week, and that an entrant that limits delivery to 2 days per week only needs 3% 
of the volume. An appendix to SEO (2003) contains a separate analysis by the economic 
consultancy firm Nolan, Norton & Co that complements the Cohen and Chu (1997) 
methodology with data obtained from market parties and that discusses several 
alternative entry strategies. A green-field entrant, which has labor costs that are 60% of 
those of TNT Post, and that limits delivery to 2 days per week, needs 4% market share 
to reach cost parity with TNT. Such entrant would be very profitable if it would attract its 
business with a 10% discount as compared to the prices charged by TNT. In case the 
entrant already operates on related markets and hence can profit from economies of 
scope, entry (at existing prices minus 10%) would be profitable already with 1% market 
share, while cost parity would be obtained with 2% market share. 
 
Given that the various estimates for the critical market share vary widely, it is important 
to complement the above model analyses with actual experiences. In the Netherlands, 
two entrants, Sandd and SelektMail, each had about 2,5% of the market in 2004 and 
each of them claims to make a profit. In Germany, PIN-AG, an entrant that started 
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operations in 1999 and that focuses mainly on the Berlin area, claims to have reached 
profitability in 2003. Meanwhile, it has achieved around 20% of the local Berlin market. In 
Sweden, City Mail has been active since 1991, focusing mainly on delivery of pre-sorted 
bulk mail in urban areas. Jonsson and Selander (2005) report that CityMail has 7,5% of 
the overall market and that it has 25% of the market segment in which it is active. Also 
this company appears to run a profitable business. As the evidence shows, apparently, 
entrants in several countries can thus compete successfully even with relatively low 
market shares, thus showing the absence of ‘meaningful’ entry barriers.   
 
In Section 2, we concluded that, according to current legal thinking in Europe, sector-
specific regulation of downstream access would be justified only if substantial entry 
barriers are present. In this Section, we have concluded that there are no such barriers, 
hence, that regulation is not justified. In the next section, we will expand on the different 
types of entry strategies that entrants can choose from, and argue that regulation should 
try to avoid creating a bias towards certain entry modes. 
 
4. NATURAL MONOPOLY, MONOPOLISTIC BOTTLENECKS AND ACCESS 
REGULATION 
 
The reader may wonder how the above conclusion relates to the frequently made 
statement that the postal market is a natural monopoly (see, however, Ennis (2005) for a 
qualification to this statement). The answer is simple: although this statement may be 
true, it is misleading and hardly relevant for the discussion. While the term ‘natural 
monopoly’ is suggestive, the concept is associated with various misunderstandings. In 
particular, the following two statements are wrong in general: (i) “an industry that is a 
natural monopoly is best served if there is only one supplier”; (ii) “in an industry that is a 
natural monopoly, competition is not possible (viable), hence, such an industry will 
naturally be a monopoly.” 
 
To argue our claim, let us confine ourselves, for simplicity, to a single-product industry. 
In this case, the industry is said to be a natural monopoly if the cost function is sub-
additive throughout, that is, unit costs are falling with output level. Consider statement (i). 
A monopolist would, presumably, have market power, leading to a higher mark-up, 
hence, a price above marginal and average cost. A successful monopolist may raise the 
price above the level that would result under competition, even though in the latter case, 
the cost would be higher. In other words, lower cost need not translate into a lower price. 
Furthermore, if the monopolist is shielded from competition, it need not have an 
incentive (or not as strong an incentive) to reduce costs. In other words, competition may 
lead to cost reductions that may not be (as easily) available in a monopoly. Put 
differently, taking a dynamic perspective, competition may lead to entry even if costs are 
sub-additive. Of course, regulation may limit the exercise of market power by the 
monopolist, hence, it may improve allocative efficiency, while maintaining (static) cost 
efficiency. However, regulation will not be perfect and will probably not be as effective as 
competition in reducing cost. Hence statement (i) is not necessarily true. 
 
Statement (ii) – competition is not viable in naturally monopolistic industries – is true if 
competition takes the form of price competition in a setting of homogeneous goods, à la 
Bertrand. This is the most intensive form of competition that can be imagined: it 
assumes that providers do not differentiate their products, that consumers are fully 
aware of the prices and that they switch to a cheaper provider no matter how small the 
discount that this provider offers as compared to the incumbent supplier. For other forms 
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of competition that are less intense than Bertrand competition, entry is possible and can 
be profitable in markets that are natural monopolies. An example is provided by quantity 
competition à la Cournot, or in a situation of price competition with horizontally 
differentiated goods. In such cases, competition is less intense, the price cost margin is 
positive and entrants can profitably enter. Consequently, statement (ii) is not generally 
true. 
 
The above discussion is in line with the ‘'contestability’ literature (Baumol and Willig, 
1981) that showed that a natural monopoly does not in itself necessarily present 
insurmountable entry barriers, and also that, if a company does not have to sink costs in 
order to enter the market, the threat of competition will discipline the incumbent; it will 
refrain from demanding non-competitive prices because of the risk of being undercut by 
a potential entrant. In some industries, however, certain network elements are of such a 
nature that, in order to be able to provide services to the customers, access to them is 
essential: in railways and electricity, for instance, it is not economically feasible to 
reproduce the physical network. These cases involve a monopolistic bottleneck that a 
company must pass through if it wants to provide services, which provides a protective 
wall behind which the incumbent can hide.  
 
Thus, the relevant question is not whether the industry is a natural monopoly, but rather 
whether entering the market requires specific sunk investments so that there is a 
monopolistic bottleneck. As we argued in Section 3, and more extensively in De Bijl et al. 
(2003), there are no essential facilities in the postal sector. Indeed, as Section 3 has 
shown, it is possible to enter certain (product or geographical) segments of the market 
while incurring only low sunk costs and still attain a stable market position. From there, 
the entrant can eventually grow further (still with only moderate sunk costs) and find a 
stable market position once it has reached a larger size, and so forth.  
 
In short, there is room for various entry and growth strategies, and as a consequence, 
one does not have to help entrants get over a high entry barrier even at the expense of 
introducing at the same time a bias in the entrant’s strategic choices and potentially 
curbing its incentives to innovate. The absence of sunk costs allows entrants 
considerable flexibility in the design of their organization and operations; this guarantees 
a high measure of allocative efficiency over time and promotes innovation. As noted 
above, the experience of several entrants to date illustrates that there are segments of 
the postal market in which a newcomer can enter and realize positive profits. To serve 
these segments, entrants can choose entry based on negotiated access with the 
incumbent USP or end-to-end competition by investing in their own facilities. They can 
also choose to target various market segments (geographical and customer type).  
 
From telecommunications markets we know that regulation strongly affects the 
incentives on whether and how to enter the market (or a segment thereof) and that, 
since entry modes may depend, for their viability, on the regulatory framework, there is 
‘demand’ for certain regulatory interventions. The question is, however, whether 
regulators should accept to satisfy that demand and attempt to foster certain types of 
competition, or let the market determine what works best. Access in the postal sector (in 
all its forms) is a complex good, which varies according to various idiosyncratic features 
such as mailing patterns and collection patterns. A mandatory access regime, since it 
makes access under the regulated parameters readily available, can pre-empt the 
determination of the most adequate terms and conditions of access by market parties. It 
could also lead to micro-management by the regulator, with additional frictional and 
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transaction costs relative to the alternative of allowing entrants and the incumbent to 
negotiate the terms of access freely. 
 
The postal market allows for a variety of entry strategies. In the absence of barriers to 
entry, the legal and regulatory framework should, therefore, aim to avoid creating a bias 
in the strategic decisions of entrants in favor of a business model fostered by the 
regulatory intervention. 
 
In addition, it is important to note that entrants face regulatory uncertainty when deciding 
whether or not to invest. As a consequence, they may act more cautiously, to wait and 
see which regulation will apply in the liberalized segments, thus resulting in a delay of 
entry and investments, slowing down the maturing of competition: entrants choose a 
smaller coverage, or invest less in their own facilities, than without regulatory 
uncertainty. If investments are delayed in a particular segment, entry can also be 
delayed in other segments, in particular if entrants become active in a stepwise manner: 
entering the next segment only if entry in the previous one was successful. Hence, as a 
result of regulatory uncertainty, overall entry might be delayed and the strong position of 
incumbents might be maintained longer than necessary, increasing the need for heavy-
handed regulation. In addition, regulatory uncertainty creates a bias towards entry 
modes based on access, and away from investments in their own facilities. In this 
respect, it would be best to settle the access issue once and for all. 
 
In order to make access operational, both the incumbent and the entrant have to adapt their 
internal organization and processes. The incumbent has to create ‘space’ for the incoming mail 
volumes, both physically and with respect to capacity and planning. The entrant has to set up its 
processes such that they are in line with the incumbent’s requirements for incoming mail 
volumes. The investments that the firms have to do to make this possible are specific for this 
activity only. This creates a mutual dependency among the firms. In the case of unforeseen 
events, such as an ‘external event’ causing a hiccup in the incumbent’s sorting/delivery system or 
a failure by the entrant to deliver the agreed volume, the firms (or at least one of the involved 
parties) will try to renegotiate the charges and conditions of the access agreement. Given that 
their interests are not aligned, this will not be easy and will involve substantial transaction costs, 
for instance because the regulator, or perhaps a court, will have to intervene. Furthermore, given 
that contracts will always be incomplete, one can expect that these types of problems will arise 
sooner or later; see Hart (1995). An entrant that does not rely on access but invests in its own 
facilities will be facing a higher investment ‘hurdle’, but it benefits by not having to make asset-
specific investments of the type needed in the case of access-based entry. Consequently, such an 
entrant will not be subject to a ‘hold-up’ problem and costly problems of renegotiation will be 
avoided when entrants do not rely on access. As the literature shows, in the case of 
complementary assets, investment and innovation is spurred by vertical integration, hence, 
stimulating end-to-end competition may yield dynamic benefits. Policy makers would be well 
advised to take the costs and inefficiencies caused by incomplete contracts and renegotiations into 
account when designing regulatory interventions.  
 
It seems to us that, up to now, the two issues discussed in the previous paragraphs, 
regulatory uncertainty and incomplete contracting, might not yet have received the 
attention they deserve, and that due consideration of these issues may well reverse the 
preference from access-based competition over end-to-end competition. In any case, 





In this paper, we have sought to take a fresh look at European postal regulation in 
anticipation of the full opening of the market. We have focused on the regulation of 
relationships between competitors, and in particular on the need for regulation 
mandating downstream access. We have chosen to start from the fundamental 
questions and avoid the kind of shortcuts, which can be observed in some of the 
literature, whereby the outcome of regulatory processes in similar sectors is simply 
transposed over to the postal sector. 
 
The starting point must be the economics of the postal sector. On the basis of theoretical 
considerations and practical evidence, we have seen that neither economies of scale nor 
economies of scope constitute a substantial barrier to entry. Furthermore, the postal 
sector is characterized by the absence of monopolistic bottlenecks so that any sunk cost 
advantages for incumbents are not very substantial. Rather, entry in the postal sector 
can take place at different scales, and here theory and practice concur in showing that a 
number of different entry strategies are available and potentially successful. 
 
These findings have a number of consequences for the regulation. With the full opening 
of the market, regulation must be fundamentally rethought, and it must be firmly 
grounded in economic analysis. In the European context, any legal analysis must then 
start by considering competition law as a starting point, since sector-specific regulation 
must be aligned with competition law and would only be justified if the policy objectives 
could not be attained via competition law. 
 
Under competition law, our finding that there are no monopolistic bottlenecks in the 
delivery chain implies that the essential facilities doctrine cannot be used to impose 
downstream access obligations upon the dominant postal operator. Following the 
reasoning of Bronner, competitors can create a rival delivery system and bypass that of 
the incumbent, and some of them are already doing so. That these competing systems 
are not or would not be identical to the incumbent’s – whether in terms of coverage or 
frequency –does not turn the incumbent’s delivery system into an essential facility. 
Finally, on the basis of Bronner, a competitor would have to show that, even with a 
volume of business comparable to the incumbent, it would not be “economically viable” 
to put together a competing postal delivery system. As was seen in Section 3, even with 
a volume of business substantially smaller than the incumbent’s, competitors can 
already enter the market profitably on the basis of their own facilities. Accordingly, on the 
basis of the test in Bronner, downstream delivery does not constitute an essential facility. 
Furthermore, on the assumption that the incumbent postal operators would be found to 
hold a dominant position, competition law will apply to as to put them under a non-
discrimination obligation. 
 
Transposing these results in the regulatory discussion, this implies that prima facie there 
is no justification for heavy-handed regulatory intervention. This conclusion is 
strengthened when the analytical framework used to select relevant markets in the 
electronic communications sector is applied to the postal sector: in the absence of 
barriers to entry lasting over time (first condition of the three-pronged test), downstream 
access would not qualify as a candidate market for regulatory intervention. Should there 
be any intervention, the principles of adequacy and proportionality would also dictate 
that a light regulatory framework, centered on the non-discrimination obligation arising 
out of competition law, would be sufficient. 
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Caution is all the more warranted where, as in the postal sector, there is no obvious entry path, 
which would be dictated by economies of scale, network effects or other constraints. Because of 
the different cost structure (little or no sunk costs), a number of different entry strategies are 
possible in an open postal market. Furthermore, the incumbent postal operator and entrants are 
likely to have incentives to enter into negotiations on access, so that access will be granted as a 
result of relatively balanced negotiations. In the absence of any overriding reason, regulation 
should hence avoid influencing how competitors enter the market by facilitating a particular entry 
mode.  
 
We conclude by briefly relating our conclusions to those reached by several other 
researchers in the field. In connection with deregulation of network industries in the US, 
there has been an extensive discussion on the conditions in which a dominant firm 
should be forced to unbundle and share its facilities (on non-discriminatory terms) in 
order to stimulate competition. There is general agreement that compulsory access 
should be exceptional and one point of view is that the incumbent should be forced to 
share only in case of essential facilities. In line with Panzar (2002) we have argued that, 
in the postal sector, an argument for mandating downstream access cannot be built 
along these lines as the local distribution network cannot be seen as an essential facility. 
Kahn (2001) has, however, argued in favor of a stricter requirement for mandatory 
sharing in which incumbents that have inherited facilities and consequent scale 
economies from their monopolistic past would be forced to allow entrants to share in the 
associated efficiencies. Along these lines, Crew and Kleindorfer (2002), Panzar (2002) 
and Moriarty and Smith (2005) have all discussed the pros and cons involved in 
mandating downstream access. While all of these authors agree that mandating 
downstream access may facilitate entry, most also write that such a policy may have 
costs as well: it may increase transaction costs, facilitate inefficient entry and inhibit 
facility based competition. Crew and Kleindorfer (2002) and Panzar (2002) also point to 
the difficulties of setting the appropriate regulatory rates, hence, the advantages of these 
rates being negotiated commercially. In this paper, we have pointed out that, in the 
European setting, competition law will always apply, hence, without sector- specific 
regulation, the incumbent will be forced to treat competitors in the same way as 
costumers, thus further tilting the balance in favor of negotiated access. Finally, in line 
with Kahn (2001) we have argued that mandatory access risks interfering with facilities-based 
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